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IN THE .SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STRATFORD L. WENDELBOE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
RICHARD B. JACOBSON, BILLY 
JOE LANG, and JOHN H. 
DOUGLAS, 
Defendants ~and Respondents. 
Case No. 9025 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIE.F 
The plaintiff in the above entitled case respectfully 
petitions the court to grant a rehearing on the ground 
and for the reasons that the opinion and decision of the 
court is erroneous in the following respects: 
POINT 1: The court erred in holding that the evi-
dence viewed in the light most favorable to the defend-
ants was reasonably susceptible to the jury's finding in 
favor of the defendants. The evidence is clear and con-
vincing that the plaintiff was arrested while trying to 
comply with the officers' demand. 
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POINT 2: The court erred in holding that Instruc-
tion 17, while ill advised and unnecessary, was not pre-
judicial. 
WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays that the court 
re-examine the facts and the law to the end that the opin-
ion correctly states such facts and that the law be cor-
rectly applied to such facts and the case be reversed. 
SUMNER J. HATCH and 
RAYS. 1fcCARTY 
Attorneys for Pet~tioner 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
I, Sumner J. Hatch, one of the attorneys for the 
petitioner, certify that I have carefully re-examined the 
record of the above entitled case and in my opinion the 
foregoing petition for rehearing is meritorious. The 
record in the case should be re-examined to the end that 
the errors alleged in the petition be corrected. 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The petitioner feels that were the opinion and judg-
ment of this court to stand as written in the above en-
titled case, it would cause great injustice to the plaintiff 
and also create dangerous precedents of law. 
When this case was argued in the Supreme Court, 
it was argued before five justices. When the opinion 
came down, the plaintiff for the first time discovered that 
the case had been decided by a court of four justices. 
Had the plaintiff or his attorneys been consulted, they 
would have informed the court that they preferred that 
the case be discussed and decided by the full court. The 
petitioner respectfully requests that this petition be 
considered by, and if granted be heard by, a full court. 
POINT I. 
THE COUR'T ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVI-
DENCE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO 
THE DEFENDANTS WAS REASONABLY SUSCEPTIBLE 
TO THE JURY'S FINDING IN FAVOR OF 'THE DEFEND-
ANTS. THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF vVAS ARRESTED WHILE TRYING 
TO COMPLY WITH THE OFFICERS' DEMAND. 
This court, in paragraph 2 and 3, page 2, Case No. 
9025, assumed that the jury made its finding on the basis 
of an arrest for failure of the plaintiff to produce a cer-
tificate of registration. Even viewing the evidence n1ost 
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favorable to the defendants, yes, even taking their evi-
dence alone without considering evidence and testimony 
of the plaintiff, there is not evidence to sustain the ver-
dict. The rule of law stated in the Toomer case admitted-
ly is the law, but if the jury makes its decision by view-
ing the evidence through distorted glasses (faulty in-
structions such as 7 and 17) the rule does not apply. To 
say that the instructions were faulty but not prejudicial 
oversimplifies the issue. U.S. v. Morisett, 342 U.S. 276. 
With regard to Instruction No.7, the evidence shows, 
construing only the defendants' evidence, that the plain-
tiff when approached by officer Jacobson produced 
identification (the driver's license, Exhibit 14). Then, 
at Jacobson's request, he proceeded to look for further 
identification. At that point, according to Jacobson's 
testimony (R. 254-5-6-7), the plaintiff started to go 
through the cards in his wallet. After he had passed his 
army identification card, Jacobson asked for his regis-
tration (R. 256). While '\V endelboe was "digging for his 
registration," Jacobson ordered him out of the car, put 
him under restraint, had him put his hands on the police 
car, searched him, and then put him in the police car. 
An illegal arrest took place at this time. To this place 
and time, there is not a scintilla of evidence that the 
plaintiff had broken any law, even under Instruction 17, 
but from that moment on he was under arrest and actual 
physical restraint. By the defendant's own testimony, the 
plaintiff had his wallet in his hands "digging for his 
registration" when the arrest took place (R. 257). 
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Officer Douglas testified that Jacobson asked vVen-
delboe to get out of the car (R. 328-329). They went to 
the police car where Jacobson had hirn put his hands on 
top of the police car and searched him, taking a notebook 
and flashlight fron1 his trench coat (R. 330). 
Officer Lang testified that W endelboe was taken 
out of the car, searched, and put in the police car (R. 354-
5). Also, that Jacobson asked what wrecker he wanted 
for his car (R. 355). Lang testified that at the ti1ne 
vVendelboe was in his own car, he was not asked for 
further identification other than his driver's license (R. 
352). 
Richard Jacobson in his statement to L. R. Greeson 
(Exhibit 20) said: 
"While he was fumbling in his wallet, I asked 
him to be seated in the police car, that we might 
have more light ... Since W endelboe· was reluct-
ant to get into the car, I asked him what he was 
doing in that location, and he stated that it was 
none of my damn business what he was doing, 
stating that he was a citizen, and had a right to he 
there. 
"At this time, he was advised that he could 
consider himself in custody ... " 
In his supplementary report to the record of arrest (Ex-
hibit 19) Jacobson states: 
"We attempted to check him out, however, 
this man refused to cooperate or answer any 
questions. He produced his driver's license. When 
asked what he was doing in this area he stated 
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that it was none of our business. He was told 
that he could consider himself in custody, and was 
directed to sit in the police car." 
Again tl~ere is no 1nention or reference to the registra-
tion. In the record of arrest (Exhibit 23) it is stated: 
"This 1nan was arrested at 3 :00 A.JH. for be-
ing drunk and sitting in a car he was taken out of 
his car and placed in the police car and suddenly 
broke out of the police car and started to fight. 
,, 
The record of arrest shows charges of assault and 
battery, drunk, resisting, and vagrancy, but 1nakes no 
reference to the registration. Neither Lang nor Douglas 
mention the registration in their reports to the police de-
partment (Exhibits 21 and 22). In fact, this aspect of 
the case (the registration) never arose until approxi-
mately two 1nonths later when various amendments to 
the criminal charges were dismissed by the City Court 
upon W endelboe's demurrers. 
It is apparent from the entire record, and more ex-
clusively from the testimony and reports of the defend-
ants (without considering the plaintiff's evidence), that 
the plaintiff was arrested while he was getting informa-
tion requested by the officers and at a time he had com-
mitted no crime whatsoever. All events thereafter were 
subsequent to a false arrest. 
The arrest took place immediately after W endelboe 
told Jacobson that what he was doing in the car was 
"none of their business'' or "none of their damn busi-
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ness,'' but as this court held in Myers v. Collett, 1 Utah 
2d 406, 268 P(2d) 432: 
"Further, there is smne evidence that the 
arrest would not have been made had it not been 
for the i1npudence of one of the boys toward the 
officers, which, of course, is not sufficient as a 
breach of the peace to warrant an arrest." 
This court, in Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 
Pac. 23, has set forth the law of arrest in this state. The 
law of arrest is further stated in Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 
Utah 530, 57 P(2d) 1128, as set forth in plaintiff's brief 
on pages 37 and 38. 
In State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071, this 
court states : 
"The decision of the courts are practically 
unanimous that whether an officer was authorized 
to make an arrest, or whether the arrest was law-
ful or unlawful, when the facts are not in dispute, 
is a question of law for the court." 
Looking at the record based on defendants' testi-
mony and reports alone and not considering plaintiff's 
testimony, the evidence is clear and convincing that the 
plaintiff was arrested at a time when he had broken no 
law whatsoever, and the lower court was under a duty 
to decide the question of validity of the arrest as a matter 
of law and not submit it to a jury under Instructions 7, 
9, 10, and 17. The entire evidence considered together 
shows only a failure to produce a registration because 
the acts of the officers prevented him from producing 
that registration which was in his wallet at all times. 
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The events transpiring after the illegal arrest, even 
though they may have been construed to constitute a 
subsequent misdemeanor, could not make valid the illegal 
arrest. If W endelboe was arrested for failure to produce 
a registration on demand of a police officer, why wasn't 
he charged with that offense~ Is it not apparent that 
when the arrest could not be justified on any of the 
numerous charges which were filed, the City attempted 
to rectify the false arrest on the basis that W endelboe 
did not instantaneously produce an automobile registra-
tion~ 
POINT 2. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT INSTRUC-
TION 17, WHILE ILL ADVISED, UNNECESSARY AND AR-
GUMENTATIVE, WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
This court, after quoting disconnected portions of the 
trial court's Instruction No.17, makes the statement: 
"We see nothing in this instruction incon-
sistent with the la\Y of tlris jurisdiction" Supreme 
Court's Opinion 9025, page 2. 
and in support of that staten1ent cites 10-6-66, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, 31-1-18, Salt Lake City Ordinances 1955, 
76-28-54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and 32-1-31, Salt 
Lake City Ordinances 1955. 10-6-66, Utah Code Anno-
tated, reads as follows: 
"Police officers- Powers and duties.- All 
police officers of any city shall possess the powers 
conferred upon constables by law. It shall be the 
duty of the police force in any city at all times 
to preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect 
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and arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect per-
sons and property, remove nuisances existing in 
the public streets, roads and highways, enforce 
every law relating to the suppression of offenses, 
and perform all duties enjoined upon them by 
ordinance.'' 
See Roe v. Lundstrom, supra. 31-1-18, Salt Lake City 
Ordinances, is a word-for-word recitation of 10-6-66, Utah 
Code Annotated, citing as a caveat Jackson v. Iiarrves, 
65 Utah 282, 236 Pac. 234. 
76-28-54, Utah Code Annotated states: 
"Resisting or obstructing officers in dis-
charge of duty. - Every person who wilfully re-
sists, delays or obstructs any public officer in dis-
charging, or attempting to discharge, any duty 
of his office, when no other punishment is pre-
scribed, is punishable by fine not exceeding $1,000 
or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceed-
ing one year, or by both.'' 
See State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360, 368, 10 P(2d) 1073. 
Also see Annotation at 48 A.L.R. 746. 
32-1-31, Salt Lake City Ordinances 1955, states: 
"Interfering with officer in discharge of duty 
prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person in 
any way to interfere with, resist, molest or 
threaten any officer of Salt Lake City, while in 
the discharge of his official duties.'' 
The trial court in Instruction No. 6 (R. 476) set 
forth the law with regard to these statutes and ordi-
nances correctly as follows: 
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"You are instructed that it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person in any way to interfere with, 
resist, molest, or threaten any officer of Salt Lake 
City while in discharge of his official duties." 
Volume 1, Reid Branson's Instruction to Jury, 1960 
Replacement, Section 101, approves quoting of an un-
ambiguous statute or ordinance in an instruction. This 
the trial court did in Instruction 6, Instruction 9, and 
Instruction 10. This court has stated that impudence or 
sauciness to an officer is not a violation substantiating 
or authorizing an arrest. Myers v. Collett, supra. 
After the statement in Instruction 6, by its Instruc-
tion 17 the trial court goes into an argumentative dis-
course at R. 483 to R. 484 that entirely nullifies and 
contradicts Instructions 6, 7, 9 and 10, and leaves such a 
state of confusion that said instruction must be prejudi-
cial. 
In addition to the often repeated, emphasized 
phrases which this court at page 2, paragraph 6, Opinion 
No. 9025, admits to be unnecessary, ill advised, and argu-
mentative, the instruction states: 
"And such person if he willfully does or says 
anything which resists, interferes with, delays 
or obstructs the police officer in the legal exer-
cise of his duties, such person at that moment 
by such staternen,t or conduct itself is guilty of a 
crin1e and public offense." (Instruction 17). 
This instruction is not only contradictory to Instructions 
6, 7, 9 and 10, so as to be n1isleading (see Y ol. 1, Reid 
Branson's Instructions to Jury, 1960 Replacement, Sec-
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tion 104, page 298), but gives undue prominence to a 
particular feature or phase of the case (see Reid Bran-
son, supra, Section 105), and gives the law incorrectly 
regarding that particular feature in that Instruction 17 
states that it is a crime to say anything or make a state-
ment which an officer might regard as interfering, see 
Myers v. Collett, supra. 
It cannot be denied that under Instruction 17 the 
jury could have found the plaintiff liable to arrest due 
to his statement "none of your damn business, I have my 
rights'' as readily as they could have for a failure to 
produce a registration (see Point 1), Konold v. Rvo 
Gran.de W. R.R. Co., 21 Utah 379, 60 Pac. 1021. 
The instruction further uses the word "possibility" 
in lieu of "probability", and uses the phrase that he 
"might be about to commit any public offense whatso-
ever." Reading of the full instruction must necessarily 
leave a jury with the idea that if a person should so 
much as use the words "just a minute'' to an officer, he 
would be subject to arrest for delay and interference. 
This instruction cannot be reconciled with the law of 
arrest as stated by the court in Instructions 9 and 10 
and the last paragraph of Instruction 6. The instruction 
not only does not correctly state the law, but has all the 
vices denounced by the texts, namely, it is argumentative, 
unduly emphasizes one phase of the case, and comments 
on the evidence. 
It is stated in U.S. v. M oriJsett, supra: 
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"Had the jury decided the case and found for 
the defendants on proper instructions it would be 
the end of the matter, but juries are not bound 
by what seems inescapable logic to judges." 
In the W endelboe case the jury was out for half a 
day, returned the next morning and deliberated for an-
other half day before coming in with a verdict. Under the 
instructions complained of in this demand for rehearing 
and the plaintiff's original brief, the jury must have 
been under a state of confusion which left no other possi-
bility than the verdict arrived at. Due to the erroneous 
instructions and the state of the evidence from the record, 
a rehearing should be allowed and the case reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons that (1) the evidence is clear and 
convincing that W endelboe was placed under arrest and 
searched before being given a chance to produce request-
ed registration, and ( 2) Instructions 7 and 17 cannot be 
reconciled with Instructions 9 and 10 because Instruction 
17 is not or should not be the law of this jurisdiction and 
does violence to the constitutional rights of all persons 
accosted by police officers, the plaintiff respectfully re-
quests that the court consider this petition and brief and 
grant a rehearing of the appeal before a full court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMNER J. HATCH and 
RAY S. 1\!cCARTY 
Attorneys for Plai'Yitvff and 
Appellant 
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